CRMsoc v. 0.2

A new foundational perspective

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CIDOC CRM SIG

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CRMsoc : Model for Social Phenomena

Compatible models & Collaborations

In this section you can find all compatible models and collaborations to the CIDOC CRM. Each one of them will navigate you to its corresponding web page.



Modelling phenomena of social life

What are we talking about?

The starting point

Issue 359: mental state

« I propose to introduce a class "mental state" as *superclass* of *intention and belief*.

I argue that "mental state" is neither a relationship nor a "state" in the epistemological sense we have defined, regardless the label. I argue that it is actively maintained, can be witnessed, become weak, fuzzy and depends existentially on the carrier, possibly a group.

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Martin Doerr, Issue 359: mental state

Modelling principles in CRMbase: Reality, Knowledge Bases and CIDOC CRM

(Definition of the CIDOC Conceptual Reference Model, Version 7.1.1, April 2021)

"The material reality.


For the purpose of the CIDOC CRM, *material reality* is regarded as whatever has substance that can be perceived with senses or instruments. Examples are [...]. It is constrained to space and time.

What goes on in our minds or is produced by our minds is also regarded as part of the material reality, as *it becomes materially evident to other people* at least by our utterances, behavior and products. "

Material reality

Mental reality


Material reality



Social reality

Mental reality


Material reality



Social reality


Mental reality


Material reality





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
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




How to model social life ?


A foundational approach

Integration of information extracted from documents using the CIDOC CRM




Stephen Stead (2008). Cf. Doerr M. (2003), fig. 4, p. 81


Factual information as a representation of states of affairs in the world



Integration of information extracted from documents using the CIDOC CRM



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« In philosophy, *intentionality* is the *power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things*, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual's mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents. »

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/

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« *Collective intentionality* is the *power of minds to be jointly directed at objects*, matters of fact, states of affairs, goals, or values. [...] Collective intentional attitudes permeate our everyday lives, for instance when two or more agents look after or raise a child, grieve the loss of a loved one, campaign for a political party, or cheer for a sports team.

They are relevant for philosophers and social scientists because they play crucial roles in the constitution of the social world.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collective-intentionality/

The observed phenomenon : different mental and social representations of the same material reality

Material reality

* Social representations : Social psychology \rightarrow social sciences

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« social identity emerges based on social representations ... Identity is a way of organizing meanings, of being constructed as a social subject »

Álvarez Bermúdez, Javier and Juana Juárez-Romero. "Identities, Memory and the Construction of Citizenship." Papers on Social Representations 28, no. 2 (2019).

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* Collective intentionality : Social philosophy

« Consciousness and intentionality are caused by and realized in neurobiology. Collective intentionality is a type of intentionality, and society is created by collective intentionality. ... language enables the creation and continued existence of status functions that do not require any physical existence beyond the linguistic representations themselves. »

John Searle. Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford University Press, 2010.

Refer to standard conceptualizations of observable mental and social phenomena and align them with CRMbase


Reference literature (selection):

* Gallotti Mattia and Michael John (éds.), Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition, Dordrecht, Springer Netherlands, 2014.

* Sammut Gordon et al. (éds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Social Representations, Cambridge, University Press, 2015.

* The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (online) (especially entries: Collective Intentionality, Mental Representation, Consciousness and Intentionality, Social Norms, etc.)

* Thomas T. (ed.), Encyclopedia of critical psychology (New York: Springer Reference, 2014) (especially entries: Interobjectivity; Social Constructionism; Social Representations; Socialisation). Whose collective intentionality is to be modelled? Scientific knowledge and social representations



The starting point

Issue 359: mental state

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
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The CIDOC CRM (ISO21127:2006) A semantic framework that provides *interoperability* between different sources of cultural heritage information



Stephen Stead (2008)

crm:E2 Temporal Entity

crm:E4 Period

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crm-soc:C2 Intention

crm:E2 Temporal Entity

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crm-soc:C4 Institutional Fact

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* Avoid taking a position on the « Central Problem »:

Collective intentionality is no simple summation of individual intentionality (the Irreducibility Claim);

Collective intentionality is had by the participating individuals, and all the intentionality an individual has is their own (the Individual Ownership Claim).

(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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A foundational approach

